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"In Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's 'Faust,' the title character asks
the devil for good health. The devil replies:
All right, you need no sorcery
And no physician and no dough.
Just go into the fields and see
What fun it is to dig and hoe;
Live simply and keep all your thoughts
On a few simple objects glued;
Restrict yourself and eat the plainest food.
That is the surest remedy:
At 80, you would still be young."1
Wouldn't it be nice if the recipe for maintaining good health was
that simple? For many Americans, in addition to a healthy diet and
regular exercise, striving for and maintaining good health includes
(contrary to what Goethe's devil says) regular visits to a physician.
For others, maintaining good health may consist of a visit to their
massage therapist, chiropractor, acupuncturist, naturopathic physician,
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or other "nontraditional" or alternative health care provider. "To each
his or her own," right? Wrong. A dilemma always arises with the
provision of health care services: Americans want to choose their
health care providers and they want their health insurance to cover
visits to any of those providers. This problem is especially acute in the
area of natural medicine, or alternative care.
Americans by the millions are turning to nontraditional or
alternative means for medical treatment.2 Alternative medicine, once
considered quackery, is rapidly taking root.3 According to a 1993
study in the New England Journal of Medicine, nearly one-third of all
Americans have at least once sought some form of alternative medical
treatment.4 This alternative medical treatment came from those who
have been compared to the likes of "snake oil salesmen" or "crack-
pots. ' Nowhere is alternative medicine becoming more a part of
mainstream medicine than in Washington state.6
As an example, in early 1996, the King County Council voted
unanimously to establish the nation's first government-subsidized
natural medicine clinic, "in which diet, exercise, vitamins and
treatments like acupuncture take precedence over drugs and the tools
of conventional medicine."7 Also in early 1996, the state of Washing-
ton began requiring health insurers to cover treatments like acupunc-
ture, massage therapy, and other forms of licensed natural health care.'
It is important to note that "licensed natural health care" means
something different in Washington than it does in other states:
Washington is one of only ten states that licenses naturopathic
doctors.9 Contrast this with New York, which does not license
naturopaths, and with California, where the Legislature has refused to
allow naturopaths to rise to the status of licensed practitioners, a far
cry from forcing insurers to pay for naturopaths' services. 10 Unlike
the government-subsidized natural medicine clinic, the mandate
2. See Timothy Egan, Seattle Area Giving Natural Medicine a Chance to Come in From the
Fringe, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 3, 1996, at A10.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Larry Stemp, D.C., Editorial, Alternative Care Isn't Problem-And Could Be Part of
Solution, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, September 16, 1996, at A9.
6. See Egan, supra note 2.
7. Id.; see also Tom Philp, Shotgun Wedding Up North, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 2, 1996,
at A10.
8. See Egan, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Egan, supra note 2; Philp, supra note 7.
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requiring insurers to cover "Every Category of Provider," has been
steeped in controversy.11
The controversy began on December 19, 1995,12 when the Office
of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC) issued a Bulletin 3 to provide
guidance to disability insurers,'4 health care services contractors, 5
and health maintenance organizations 6 on the OIC interpretation of
title 48, chapter 43, section 45 of the Washington Revised Code,
referred to as the "Every Category of Provider" statute. 7 The
interpretation, or policy statement, that was presented in the Bulletin
11. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.045 (1996). The statute is entitled "Health Plan
Requirements-Annual Reports." Id. For purposes of this Comment, the statute will be referred
to as "Every Category of Provider" which is taken directly from language included in the statute.
See id.
12. Actually, the controversy began in 1993 with the passage of global health care reform
in 1993. See discussion infra Part I. For purposes of this Note, however, "controversy" refers
to the events giving rise and leading up to the litigation between the Office of the Insurance
Commissioner and health insurers.
13. See Bulletin No. 95-9, issued Dec. 19,1995 by Deborah Senn, Insurance Commissioner.
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.010 (12) (1996). Disability insurers are the entities
responsible for the payment of health benefits or provision of health care services under a group
or individual health insurance contract. See id.
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.010 (3) (1996). Health care service contractors are defined
as:
any corporation, cooperative group, or association, which is sponsored by or otherwise
intimately connected with a provider or group of providers, who or which not otherwise
being engaged in the insurance business, accepts prepayment for health care services
from or for the benefit of persons or groups of persons as consideration for providing
such persons with any health care services.
Id.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.46.020 (1996). Health maintenance organizations are defined
as:
any organization receiving a certificate of registration by the commissioner under this
chapter which provides comprehensive health care services to enrolled participants of
such organization on a group practice per capita prepayment basis ... either directly
or through contractual or other agreements with other institutions, entities, or persons,
and which qualifies as a health maintenance organization....
Id.
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.045 states in pertinent part:
Every health plan delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed by a health carrier on and
after January 1, 1996, shall:
(1) Permit every category of health care provider to provide health services or care for
conditions included in the basic health plan services to the extent that:
(a) The provision of such health services or care is within the health care providers'
limited scope of practice; and
(b) The providers agree to abide by standards related to:
(i) Provision, utilization review, and cost containment of health services;
(ii) Management and administrative procedures; and
(iii) Provision of cost effective and clinically efficacious health services.
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and subsequently in a Declaratory Order,"8 unleashed a mass of
litigation as disability insurers, health care services contractors
(HCSCs), and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) sued
Deborah Senn, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Washington. 19
In essence, the Bulletin and the subsequent Declaratory Order
interpreting the statute required "every health plan2' delivered, issued
for delivery, or renewed on or after January 1, 1996," to include all
categories of providers in every health plan.21 What this meant for
disability insurers, HCSCs, and HMOs was that they had to include
every category of alternative health care provider2 2 within their health
insurance benefits packages.23  Health insurance policy holders were
thereby given an option to select alternative types of providers, as well
as traditional medical providers, to treat their health conditions.
In the first lawsuit filed against Senn, the plaintiffs made three
allegations: (1) the Bulletin is a rule issued in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act;24 (2) the Bulletin is contrary to and
exceeds the scope of the statute on which it is based; and (3) the
Bulletin's application of title 48, chapter 43, section 45 of the
Washington Revised Code to every health plan issued in the state
renders it preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).25
18. See Declaratory Order G96-13, issued on August 21, 1996 by Deborah Senn, Insurance
Commissioner. The Declaratory Order reiterated and expanded upon the Insurance Commission-
er's position as described in Bulletin 95-9.
19. See Blue Cross of Washington and Alaska v. Senn, No. 96-2-00137-3 (Wash. Super.
Ct., Thurston County filed Jan. 8, 1996) (eleven health insurance carriers joined Blue Cross of
Washington and Alaska in the lawsuit); Washington Physician Service Ass'n v. Gregoire, 967 F.
Supp. 424 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (eleven health insurance carriers joined Washington Physician
Service Ass'n in the lawsuit).
20. Health plan "means any policy, contract, or agreement offered by a Health Carrier to
provide, arrange, reimburse, or pay for health care services except... (i) Employer-sponsored,
self-funded plans." WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.005(9) (1996).
21. See Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1; Declaratory Order, supra note 18, at 2.
22. Alternative health care providers are found and included in title 18, chapter 120, section
020(4) of the Washington Revised Code. The statute includes, among others, licensed massage
therapists, chiropractors, naturopaths, and acupuncturists. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.120.020(4).
See also Bulletin 95-9 (3) which states, "[i]f a health plan covers rehabilitation therapy, that
service must be covered whether treatment is rendered by an osteopathic physician, chiropractor,
a registered therapist, or a licensed massage therapist..." Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1-2.
23. See Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1; see also Declaratory Order, supra note 13, at 2.
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05 (1996).
25. See Brief of Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Blue Cross of
Washington and Alaska v. Senn, No. 96-2-00137-3, at 2 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston County,
1996) [hereinafter Blue Cross Brief] (on file with the Seattle University Law Review). See also 29
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
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A Thurston County Superior Court judge ruled on April 8, 1996,
that the Insurance Commissioner acted within her authority in issuing
the Bulletin which interpreted the "Every Category of Provider"
requirements.26 The judge further ruled that the Bulletin was not a
rule, that Senn did not exceed her authority in issuing the Bulletin, and
that the plaintiffs had to exhaust their administrative remedies in
challenging Senn's action before filing a lawsuit.27 The ERISA
challenge, which focused on the language of the statute and its
interpretation, was moved to federal district court.28 There, the
federal judge overturned the statute, holding that the law was rendered
preempted under ERISA. 29  The insurance commissioner has ap-
pealed the ruling.3"
What is troubling about the statute, its interpretation, and the
litigation is that the policies underlying the initial legislation have been
lost in the battles between the Insurance Commissioner and insurers.
The "Every Category of Provider" statute was public interest legisla-
tion asking insurance carriers to include, while giving policyholders a
choice of, alternative care providers. As a result of the Insurance
Commissioner's interpretory mandate, and what was probably the
proverbial "straw that broke the insurers' back,"'" Washingtonians
have lost statutory support for consumer choice. The unfortunate
outcome is that Commissioner Senn, in issuing the mandate, ultimately
harmed the consumers she so vehemently fights to protect.32
26. Judge Upholds Commissioner's Authority to Issue Alternative Provider Bulletin, HEALTH
CARE DAILY REP. (BNA), April 15, 1996, at D-7.
27. See id.
28. See Washington Physician Service Ass'n v. Gregoire, 967 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. Wash.
1997).
29. On May 2, 1997, United States District Judge Franklin D. Burgess issued an order
granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. See Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Denying Defendants' Cross, Motion for Summary Judgment,
Washington Physician Service Ass'n v. Gregoire, 967 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. Wash. lawsuit filed
Sept. 19, 1996; Order granted May 2, 1997) (No. C96-5850FDB) (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review); see also discussion infra Part III.
30. See Washington: Some Insurers Continue Covering Alternative Providers Despite Ruling,
HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (BNA), September 15, 1997, at D-10.
31. There have been many battles fought between Commissioner Senn and the insurance
industry. Some of those disagreements have been over insurers' attempts at rate increases for
individual health-care policyholders, medical coverage rates, pollution claims rules, and industry
tax write-offs. See William DiBenedetto, J. OF COM., March 13, 1996, at A9; see also Peter
Neurath, Insurers Again Challenge Senn's Health-Care Actions, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., Jan. 12,
1996, at sec. 1, p. 5.
32. See Lynne K. Varner, Senn's Reforms Drawing GOP Fire-Rivals Target Rise in
Insurance, THE SEATTLE TIMES, September 8, 1996, at B1 (stating that Senn's initial platform
when she ran in 1992 was based on popular consumer-activism; that platform remains her main
focus).
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In addition, the insurers look like the "bad guys" and appear
unsupportive of alternative care and third-party reimbursement for that
care. Nothing, however, could be further from the truth.3 At the
time the statute was passed, before issuance of the Bulletin, insurers
were trying to figure out how much the newly-authorized services
would cost and how to reimburse them.34  The insurers already had
reason to study these services because they had obtained data showing
that Washingtonians were spending approximately $475 million each
year out of their own pockets for alternative medicine treatments.3
As a result of those out-of-pocket expenses, consumers began
demanding third-party reimbursement of those services. 6 Insurers
understood that the public interest legislation, combined with consumer
demand, required action. Rather than ignoring these market forces,
33. See Tom Paulson, Insurance Soon To Go Alternative; New Law Will Cover Natural
Therapies, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, December 16, 1995, at A22 (citing examples showing
Washington health insurance carriers looking at the option of creating an alternative care benefit).
The examples include: a pilot program offered by Blue Cross of Washington and Alaska
called "Alternapath," in which the company offered separate insurance for certain alternative
therapies; a system whereby subscribers of King County Medical Blue Shield's [now called
"Regence"] managed-care programs are allowed to be treated by alternative providers, including
massage therapists, acupuncturists, and naturopaths serving as either primary-care physicians or
specialists; and similar options under consideration by Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound
and Providence Health Plans. See Paul J. Lira and Susan Byrnes, Insurers Begin to Cover
Alternative Care, THE SEATTLE TIMES, December 13, 1995, at El.
34. Discussion with Jill Mehner, Director of Medical Services for Health Washington, May
7, 1997 (her responsibilities include negotiating contracts between Health Washington, (a "health
carrier") and providers). "The standard reimbursement for medical services rendered is generally
based on CPT [current procedural terminology] codes and submitted on a universal billing
statement. These codes tell us [the insurance company] what services were provided by the
licensed professionals." Id. For example, "we might receive a claim with three CPT codes which
would explain, 1) the patient was new to that provider, 2) the patient had an x-ray, and 3) the
patient had a lab test." Id.
"This billing practice is not typical for most allied [alternative care] professionals. A massage
therapist, for example, might submit a billing statement, not the standard universal form, for a
one hour massage." Id. The problem with this, "is that we have no way to interpret what that
means [in our standard CPT language] so that we can reimburse the provider. A massive
education process is necessary so that common billing terminology and practices are understood."
Id.
35. See John Weeks, Marrying the Medicines After Rocky Start, Experiment in Holistic Care
Proving Workable, THE SEATTLE TIMES, April 6, 1997, at Post-Intelligencer Focus, F1.
36. This is anecdotal information taken from the author's experience of providing informa-
tion to health plan subscribers at "open enrollment" meetings. Open enrollment takes place once
each year for those individuals enrolled in an employer or government-sponsored health plan.
At meetings during the 1995 and 1996 plan years, employees, some from the Northwest's
largest corporations, as well as Washington state employees, asked why alternative care was not
included in their health benefit packages.
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insurers began to research and test ways in which they might cover
various treatments.37
Another factor compounding the insurers' issue of how to provide
coverage for alternative care services in a manner consistent with
market demand, is that both health insurers and traditional health
providers have had a clear bias against any form of alternative care. 8
Stories making the rounds, for example, told of chiropractors treating
liver disease and cancer39 and of gullible consumers being duped into
paying for unnecessary treatments. 4' Insurers, traditional providers,
and alternative care providers had to come to some mutual understand-
ing to bridge their different cultures and distinct orientations. 41 "One
is high-tech, the other human-intensive. One focuses on attacking
disease and microbes with drugs and surgeries, the other on restoring
and promoting health through physical therapies, therapeutic nutrition
and patient-centered initiatives." 42  The two worlds could not be
farther apart. And, just as the two groups were beginning to build the
bridge between them, the OIC issued the interpretory mandate
enforcing the statute, and the subsequent litigation overturned and
preempted both the statute and its interpretation.43 Unfortunately
"the relationship got sidetracked by the litigation. '44
True, the relationship may have been sidetracked, but it is not
completely off course. What is so ironic about this whole process, i.e.,
statute passage, statute interpretation, litigation, and ultimate preemp-
tion, is that all of the aforementioned parties continue to work toward
an integrated health care system that provides access to treatments by
all licensed providers.45 The creation of this integrated system, which
has been on-going since the statute was passed, has not really been
interrupted.46
Why then did the insurers and Commissioner Senn litigate over
the statute? The answer is simple: they litigated as a result of the
37. See Lim and Byrnes, supra note 33, at El.
38. See Weeks, supra note 35, at F1 (citing decades of antagonism and name-calling between
traditional and alternative professions).
39. See Stemp, supra note 5.
40. See id.
41. See Weeks, supra note 35, at Fl.
42. Id.
43. See discussion infra Parts I, III.
44. See Weeks, supra note 35, at F1 (citing a health plan medical director's statement).
45. Washington: Some Insurers Continue Covering Alternative Providers Despite Ruling,
HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (BNA), September 15, 1997, at D-10.
46. See id.
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statute's interpretation and not over the statute itself.4 7  When the
statute was passed, insurers, and at least some of the lawmakers who
voted for the provision, thought the intent was to make alternative
medicine available under the controls of managed care.4" Rather than
agree with this interpretation, Commissioner Senn mandated the
inclusion of alternative health services in all health plans sold in
Washington state.49 In Commissioner Senn's defense, she issued the
mandate because she believed the insurers would not comply with any
of the statute's provisions."0
However, the mandate forced insurers to litigate over the statute's
interpretation and ultimately over the statute itself.5" Without the
mandate, this litigation might not have ensued and the relationships
would have continued-minus the added cost of litigation. But then,
of course, hindsight is 20/20 vision.
Alternative medicine, like it or not, is here to stay. It is in the
best interests of all of us to support the insurance industry, the
traditional health care industry, and the alternative medicine industry
to create a system that provides-in the most cost-effective, quality-
based manner-the best of both worlds. The best of both worlds is
achieved, from a consumer's perspective, through choice. This means
that "people who distrust conventional medicine and prefer, say, the
services of an acupuncturist are still free to buy an insurance plan that
covers acupuncture. 51 2  "But people who question [the effectiveness
of alternative or] nontraditional therapies should not be required to pay
extra for that coverage." 3 In order to achieve this consumer choice,
the statute must remain intact-not as it was interpreted, but as it was
intended. Without minimal statutory support, consumer choice,
whether it is for inclusion or exclusion of these services, disappears.
This Comment contends that if the statute had been properly
limited, as intended and not as interpreted, it would not have met its
47. There was no litigation over the language of the statute until after Commissioner Senn
issued the Bulletin on December 19, 1995. The first lawsuit was filed on January 8, 1996. See
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
48. See Second Substitute Senate Bill (SSSB) 5304, entitled Health Services Act-Access and
Cost Control, 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 431 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.170(1)
repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
49. See Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1. Employer-sponsored, self-funded plans were
excluded from the mandate. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.005(a) (1996).
50. See Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1. "Many disturbing reports have reached my office
indicating that certain carriers are considering actions which dearly fail to satisfy the requirements
of RCW 48.43.045." Id.
51. See discussion infra Part III.
52. See Stemp, supra note 5, at A14.
53. See id.
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ultimate fate of ERISA preemption. In order to show how this public
interest legislation could remain in effect and provide at least minimal
statutory support for consumer choice, an overview of Washington
state health care reform, ERISA preemption, and the federal district
court decision preempting the statute is necessary. In Part I, this
Comment provides a brief history of the "Every Category of Provider"
statute and the Bulletin. 4 Part II contains a summary of the subsec-
tion of ERISA which governs preemption. Part III gives an overview
of the federal district court decision and shows that the decision,
rendering both the statute and its interpretation preempted by ERISA,
was rightly decided. Finally, Part IV shows how, in hindsight, the
litigation preempting the statute was unnecessary, and how the statute
can be saved by revising it in accordance with the public policy
underlying it.
I. THE HISTORY OF "EVERY CATEGORY OF PROVIDER"
AND BULLETIN 95-9
A. "Every Category of Provider"
The "Every Category of Provider" statute did not just appear in
1995. It was part of Washington's tortured attempt at health care
reform which began in earnest in 1993. An overview of insurance
regulation and health care reform is required to understand the context
in which this statute emerged.
Beginning in 1983, the Washington Legislature raised concerns
about the rights of health insurance policy holders in the state as
follows:
The legislature finds and declares that there is a paramount concern
that the right of the people to obtain access to health care in all its
facets is being impaired .... It is, therefore, declared to be in the
public interest that [health insurance] be regulated under the police
power of the state to assure that all the people have the greatest
access to health care services."5
As a result, the Lesiglature enacted provisions of title 48 of the
Washington Revised Code to govern all insurance and insurance
54. All references to the interpretation of the statute will be to the Bulletin; the Declaratory
Order is substantially similar in language to the Bulletin. Further, the ruling in Thurston County
on the Bulletin has already occurred, while the ruling on the Declaratory Order is pending. Any
further references to the Declaratory Order will be to illustrate the Insurance Commissioner's
statements in the Bulletin.
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.309 (1996); see also WAH. REV. CODE § 48.44.299 (1996).
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transactions in Washington. 6 There are four components of health
insurance coverage regulation contained in title 48. First, a "health
carrier" or "carrier" means a disability insurer, an HCSC, or an
HMO. 7 Carriers develop and market "health plans" or "health
benefit plans."5" These health plans or health benefit plans are in the
form of policies, contracts, or agreements to provide health care
services.5 9 A "health care service" means a service offered or provid-
ed by health care facilities and providers relating to the prevention,
cure, or treatment of illness, injury, or disease.6"
A second component of health regulation is "health care provid-
ers." 61 A provider is an individual who is licensed to practice health
or health-related services according to the licensing requirements for its
respective field, as set out in title 18.62 Alternative care providers are
among the professions included in title 18.63
The third component of health regulation is OIC oversight of the
health insurance industry.64 Title 48, chapter 44, section 20 of the
Washington Revised Code requires the OIC to examine every contract
for health insurance to make sure its contents contain no ambiguities,
inconsistencies, deceptive advertising, unreasonable benefits in relation
to cost of benefits, unreasonable treatment restrictions, violations of
title 48, violations of OIC regulations, or violations of state law.65
The fourth and final component of health care insurance
regulation is the purchasing and consuming public. The OIC is
charged with protecting insurance consumers in Washington.6 6
Finding, inter alia, that existing regulation of the health insurance
industry was not sufficient to address the crisis recognized in 1983,67
a Democratic legislature and Democratic governor spoke again in 1993
by enacting global health care reform. The 1993 reform package was
56. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.020 (1996).
57. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.005(8) (1996).
58. Reply Brief of State Defendant in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Blue
Cross of Washington and Alaska v. Senn, No. 96-2-00137-3 at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston
County, 1996) [hereinafter Reply Brief, State Defendant] (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).
59. See id.
60. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.005(7) (1996).
61. See Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 5.
62. See WASH. REV. CODE § 18.120.020(4) (1996) (defining "health professions").
63. See id.
64. See Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 5.
65. See id. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.020(2) (a-h) (1996).
66. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.010 (1996); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30A
(1996).
67. See 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 101.
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where the "Every Category of Provider" language first appeared in a
statute.6" To fully grasp the policies underlying the Legislature's
intent in enacting the statute, a summary of the 1993 health care
reform and its 1995 demise is essential.
1. Washington State Health Care Reform 1993-1996
a. 1993 Legislation
In 1993, the Legislature enacted global health care reform because
it found that Washington's "health and financial security are jeopar-
dized by our ever increasing demand for health care and by current
health insurance and health system practices. ' 69  In addition, "too
many of our state's residents are without health insurance [and] each
year many families are forced into poverty because of serious illness,
and . . . leave gainful employment to be eligible for publicly funded
medical services."70 Furthermore they stated, "businesses find it
difficult to pay for health insurance and remain competitive in a global
economy, and ... individuals, the poor, and small business bear an
inequitable health insurance burden."'" As such, "immediate steps
must be taken [and] a long-term plan for reform is . . . needed."72
The legislature's intent in enacting global health care reform was
outlined as follows:
(1) ... [T]o establish structures, processes, and specific financial
limits to stabilize the overall cost of health services within the
economy, reduce the demand for unneeded health services, provide
access to essential health services, improve public health, and ensure
that health system costs do not undermine the financial viability on
nonhealth care businesses.73
Substantively, this health care reform law mandated that certain health
plans contain a uniform benefits package, and certain employer-
sponsored health plans provide a minimum uniform benefits package
with mandated essential health services." What the Legislature did,
68. See discussion, infra Part I (A)(1)(a).




73. Id. at § 401 (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
74. See id. at §§ 425, 449, 464 (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27). Essential
health services were mandated in order to emphasize proven preventive and primary health care
and include:
(a) primary and specialty health services;
(b) inpatient and outpatient hospital services;
1997]
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for the first time, was mandate a uniform benefits package for
employers. 7' The uniform benefits package was separate and distinct
from the Washington State Basic Health Plan (BHP) already in
effect.76
The "Every Category of Provider" language first appeared in
former title 43, chapter 72 of the Washington Revised Code and stated
that a certified health plan77 shall:
(1) Permit every category of health care provider to provide health
services or care for conditions included in the uniform benefits
package to the extent that:
(a) The provision of such health services or care is within the
health care providers' permitted scope of practices; and
(b) The providers agree to abide by the standards related to:
(i) Provision, utilization review, and cost containment or
health services;
(ii) Management and administrative procedures; and
(c) prescription drugs and medications;
(d) reproductive services;
(e) services necessary for maternity and well-child care, including preventive dental
services for children; and
(f) case-managed chemical dependency, mental health, short-term skilled nursing
facility, home health, and hospice services, to the extent that such services reduce
inappropriate utilization of more intensive or less efficacious medical services.
Id. at § 449(1) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
75. See 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 464 (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
76. The uniform benefits package was modeled after the Washington State Basic Health
Plan (BHP). See 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492. The Washington State Basic Health Plan was
enacted by 1987 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 5 § 4, eff. June 10, 1987, later codified at title 70,
chapter 47, section 20 of the Washington Revised Code. The BHP means the "system of
enrollment and payment on a prepaid capitated basis for the basic health care services." WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.47.020(1) (1996). Basic Health Services are similar to the essential health
services enumerated supra. See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.47. The BHP is the plan administered
by the Washington State Health Care Authority (HCA) through participating health care
providers, insurers, health care maintenance organizations or any such combinations. WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.47.060 (3) (1996). The HCA is authorized to design and revise a schedule of
covered basic health care services, including physician services, prescription medications, and
other services which may be necessary for basic health care. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.47.060(1) (1996).
In addition, the "Every Category of Provider" statute makes reference to the BHP in that
it requires health carriers to "[p]ermit every category of health care provider to provide health
services or care for conditions included in the basic health plan. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.43.045 (1996).
77. Certified health plans were part of the reform package. See former WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.72.010 (1993) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27). A certified health plan meant
"a disability insurer regulated under chapter 48.20 or 48.21 RCW, a health care service contractor
as defined in RCW 48.44.010, a health maintenance organization as defined in RCW 48.46.020
.... " Id.
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(iii) Provision of cost-effective and clinically efficacious
health services.78
What this legislation required was that "all licensed health care
providers .. .irrespective of the type or kind of practice, should be
afforded the opportunity for inclusion in the certified health plans
consistent with the goal of health care reform."7 9 However, just as
the breadth of this legislation was being understood, including its
"Every Category of Provider" language, the landscape of health care
reform took a dramatic turn.
b. 1995 Legislation
In 1995, the Legislature repealed almost all of the 1993 legislation
which enacted global health care reform, including the uniform benefits
package.8" All 1995 versions of title 48, chapter 43, entitled "Insur-
ance Reform," were new.81 The only piece of legislation from the
1993 health care reform that remained was the "Every Category of
Provider" language taken from the former title 43, chapter 72, section
100 of the Washington Revised code. 2
The newly enacted Wash. Rev. Code § 48.43.045 states in
pertinent part:
Every health plan delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed by a
health carrier on or after January 1, 1996, shall ...
78. Former WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.100 (1993) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265
§ 27).
79. Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 7 (citing former WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.43.170(2) (1993) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27)). The statute also provided:
Balancing the need for health care reform and the need to protect health care providers,
as a class and as individual providers, from improper exclusion presents a problem that
can be satisfied with the creation of a process to ensure fair consideration of the
inclusion of health care providers in managed care systems operated by certified health
plans. It is therefore the intent of the legislature that the health services commission in
developing rules .. .balance the need for cost-effective and quality delivery of health
services with the need for inclusion of both individual health care providers and
categories of health care providers in managed care programs....
Former WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.170(1) (1993) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
Health care providers were defined as: "A person regulated under title 18 RCW and chapter
70.127 RCW, to practice health or health related services or otherwise practicing health care
services in this state consistent with state law .. " 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 402(12)(a)
(repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27); see also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.70.020; 70.127.
80. Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 1046, entitled Health Care Reform Revision
and Simplification, 1995, Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 8, codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.045
(1996). Title 48, chapter 43 replaced former title 48, chapter 43 "certified Health Plans." Id.
81. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43; former WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.
82. See Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 7 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.43.045 (1996) and former WASH. REV. CODE 48.43.100 (1993)).
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(1) Permit every category of health care provider to provide health
services or care for conditions included in the basic health plan
services to the extent that:
(a) The provisions of such health services or care is within the
health care providers' limited scope of practice; and
(b) The providers agree to abide by standards related to:
(i) Provision, utilization review, and cost containment of
health services;
(ii) Management and administrative procedures; and
(iii) Provision of cost effective and clinically efficacious
health services.8 3
The differences between the former "Every Category of Provider"
statute and the newly enacted statute are twofold.14 First, coverage
under the 1995 law applies to every health insurance plan" delivered,
issued for delivery, or renewed by a health carrier on or after January
1, 1996, rather than to certified health plans.8 6 Second, instead of the
uniform benefits package as the minimum requirement or health plan,
every provider must be allowed to provide health care services or care
for conditions included in the BHP. 7
The "Every Category of Provider" statute states that carriers must
allow providers to care for conditions or provide services which are
covered under the BHP. In the Blue Cross lawsuit, 8 the State of
Washington, in its Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, gave an example of what this coverage entails, as
well as its interpretation of the statute:
[I]f the BHP covers treatment for a low back injury caused in an
auto accident, the carrier's health plan must allow a primary care
physician to refer a patient for treatment for the low back injury to
a provider which is licensed for this type of treatment. Such
referral, in the discretion of the primary care physician, may be to
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.045 (1996).
84. See Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 7.
85. It is important to note that WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.005(9) (1996), part of the newly
enacted legislation, excludes employer-sponsored self-funded health plans from WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.43.050 (1996). These self-funded plans are governed by ERISA and are excluded
from compliance with the statute.
86. See Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 7 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.43.045).
87. See id. at 7-8. See also discussion supra at note 76.
88. Blue Cross of Washington and Alaska v. Senn, No. 96-2-00137-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
Thurston County, 1996).
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a chiropractor, a naturopath, physician, a physical therapist or
massage therapist, or other appropriate provider.
This subsequent treatment by a chiropractor is dependent on
the chiropractor's actual treatment to be within his/her scope of
practice per the licensing requirements of Title 18, the chiropractor's
agreement to abide by the carrier's standards for 'provision and
utilization review, cost containment decisions, management and
administrative procedures, and the carrier's standards for cost-
effective and clinically efficacious health services.' RCW
48.43.045(1) (a), (b), (i-iii).
In short, the law is not a mandate that every willing provider
must be included in every health plan. Rather, it is a mandate that
if a consumer has a condition for which coverage exists, a primary
care physician must be able to treat or refer a patient to a provider
who can provide prevention, cure, or treatment of an injury or
disease. The provider must comply with the above referenced
statutory obligations. 9
In their briefing to the court, the carriers expressed their
understanding of how the legislative history of Engrossed Substitute
House Bill 1046 should be used to interpret "Every Category of
Provider." 90 They believed that some of the provisions included in
ESHB 1046 required "all carriers offering individual or small group
coverage plans to offer a health plan with benefits identical to the
[BHP] but also permit the sale of other plans with different cover-
ages."' In addition, the carriers quoted the language in the bill that
required them to:
market to all individuals a health benefit plan providing benefits
identical to the schedule of covered health services that are required
to be delivered to an individual enrolled in the Basic Health Plan
... nothing in this subsection(s) shall preclude a [carrier] from
offering, or an individual from purchasing, other health benefit plans
that may have more or less comprehensive benefits than the Basic
Health Plan, provided such plans are in accordance with this
chapter.9"
Clearly, these are two differing views on how to interpret the
statute. One view posits that the statute mandated an option for
consumers whereby alternative therapies could be accessed either
directly or through a referral by their primary care physician if they
89. Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 8-9.
90. See Blue Cross Brief, supra note 25, at 4 (citing 1995 Wash. Laws, ch. 265 §§ 15-18).
91. Id.
92. Blue Cross Brief, supra note 25, at 4-5. See also 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 8.
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had a condition that was treatable by an alternative care provider. 93
The other view is that insurers are only obligated to provide access to
alternative care providers through an individual or small group plan
identical to the BHP-a "BHP look-alike" plan.94
As shown by these differing views, considerable confusion
surrounded the interpretation of the statute. This confusion is an
example of what contributed to the interpretation offered by the
Insurance Commissioner in Bulletin 95-9. 9'
B. Bulletin 95-9
On December 19, 1995, the Insurance Commissioner issued
Bulletin 95-9. In the Bulletin she outlined the following requirements:
1. Inclusion of all categories of providers is required in every
health plan. The requirement applies to fee-for-service
plans96 and managed care plans.9" This requirement is not
limited to the Model Plan or in any other single plan or
plan supplement for alternative care.
2. Carriers must actually cover claims for service by all
categories of providers, not merely contract with these
providers.
3. Carriers may not exclude a category of provider by assert-
ing that the category fails to meet its standards for "cost
effective and clinically efficacious health services." Services
within the provider's permitted scope of practice must be
covered, without discrimination on the basis of provider
type. For example, if a health plan covers rehabilitation
therapy, that service must be covered whether treatment is
rendered by an osteopathic physician, a chiropractor, a
registered physical therapist, or a licensed massage thera-
pist, so long as the health care practitioner is operating
within his or her scope of practice.
4. A category of provider may not be excluded even if that
category of provider is excluded by the Basic Health Plan
of Washington. RCW 48.43.045 requires carriers to
93. See Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 8-9.
94. See Blue Cross Brief, supra note 25, at 4-5. Legislative history of ESHB 1046, however,
does not indicate that the statute is restricted to BHP look-alike plans. See 1995 Wash. Laws ch.
265, § 8.
95. There were other reasons that led to the interpretation offered by the Insurance
Commissioner in Bulletin 95-9 at 1. See supra note 50; infra note 100 and accompanying text.
96. Fee-for-service plans include those plans offered by disability insurers. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 48.43.005(8) (1996).
97. Managed care plans include those plans offered by HCSCs and HMOs. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 48.43.005(8) (1996).
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provide this access to services for any condition covered by
the Basic Health Plan. Thus, for example, even if acu-
puncturists are excluded by the Basic Health Plan, carriers
must cover services by acupuncturists if the condition
treated is one covered by the Basic Health Plan and the
acupuncturist is acting within the permitted scope of his or
her practice.
5. The law does not limit the types of providers who may be
designated by a carrier as a "Primary Care Provider"
(PCP). The Department of Health has determined that a
broad range of provider categories may function as PCPs.
6. The law requires carriers to permit every category of
provider to provide services for health care conditions
covered by the basic health plan services. If carriers
impose a limitation, such as number of visits or maximum
benefit amount, on a type of service covered by a health
plan, that limitation must be applied without regard to the
type of provider performing the service .... "
The Commissioner further threatened enforcement actions if necessary
to prevent any other practices that would circumvent the statute. 99
According to the Insurance Commissioner, the Bulletin was issued
in response to letters and questions from providers and carriers about
the OIC's approach and practices concerning what health plans were
required to allow and provide under the new statute.)10 Unfortunate-
98. Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 2. See also Declaratory Order, supra note 18, at 2.
Declaratory Order findings provide further support for the Insurance Commissioner's
interpretation in the Bulletin as follows:
Finding #1 - Conditions Covered. All services or care rendered by licensed providers
acting within the scope of practice, for conditions covered by the BHP must be covered
by a health plan.
A health plan may exclude a particular service unless, by so doing, it substantially
excludes an entire category of providers. As long as the condition is covered by the
BHP, every category of treatment must be provided, even if the treatment is excluded
by the BHP, such as acupuncture.
Finding #2 - Health Plans Covered. All health plans, except Model Plans, must comply
with RCW 48.43.045. The every category of provider statute applies to every health
plan and not just model plans. Model plans are plans which carriers are required to
market which provide benefits identical to the schedule of services provided by the
BHP. The Model Plans are an exception to the general requirement contained in RCW
48.43.045.
Finding #3 - Cost-effective and Clinically-efficacious Services. A health plan may not
exclude an entire category of providers based on their determination that certain of the
providers' services are not cost effective or clinically efficacious.
Declaratory Order, supra note 18, at 1-2.
99. Id. See also Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 2.
100. See Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 9.
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ly, this interpretation, mandating every fee-for-service and managed
plan issued by a health carrier in the state to cover treatments provided
by licensed alternative care providers, ultimately dooms the statute.10'
The end result, ERISA preemption, would not necessarily have
occurred if the statute had been narrowly interpreted. In order to
understand how ERISA preempts the statute, it is important to outline
and discuss the main features of preemption.
II. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA)
A. A Brief Summary of ERISA Preemption
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is a
comprehensive federal statute that imposes minimum standards on
employee welfare benefit plans," 2 which, through the purchase of
insurance, provide medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits to
policyholders.' 3 In 1982, as part of the comprehensive regulation of
employee benefit plans, and to prevent conflicting state regulation,
Congress enacted a broad preemption provision in ERISA.' ° Under
this preemption provision, state laws which "relate to" an employee
health benefit plan are preempted unless "saved" from preemption as
a law regulating insurance.1°5 The statute states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III shall supersede any
101. See discussion infra Part IV.
102. "Employee Welfare Benefit Plan" and "Welfare Plan"
any plan, fund or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent
that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance
or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event
of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or
prepaid legal services or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title.
29 U.S.C. 1002(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
103. See 29 U.S.C §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In ERISA, Congress set out to
[P]rotect ... participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring
the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other
information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal Courts... as set forth
in 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987).
104. See Robert S. McDonough, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated Provider Laws, 1985
DUKE L.J. 1194 (1985).
105. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan ....
(b) (2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance .... 106
A law "relates to" an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense
of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan.'0 7 "Congress uses the term 'relates to' in section 514(a) in its
broadest sense."'  The preemption clause does not apply only to
106. Id. Subparagraph (B) is known as the "deemer clause." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). The deemer clause states: Neither an employee benefit plan ... nor
any trust established under such plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any state law purporting to regulate insurance companies,
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies. Id.
Analyzing "Every Category of Provider" under the deemer clause is not necessary because
the statute does not, in its attempt to regulate insurance, does not impliedly or explicitly deem
an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company. See id.
107. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 87 (1983) (determining that a New
York law prohibiting discrimination by private employers on the basis of sex related to employee
benefit plans). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(deciding that mandated benefits were laws relating to insurance).
108. Shaw, 471 U.S. at 98-99. The legislative history cited in Shaw provides information
that the preemption language was initially narrow in scope as follows:
ERISA would supersede state laws 'relating to the reporting and disclosure responsibili-
ties, and fiduciary responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of any employee benefit
plan to which Part 1 [of ERISA] applies.
Id. The Conference Committee rejected this narrow interpretation. It decided to preempt state
laws relating to benefit plans, rather than those laws relating to those subjects covered by ERISA.
Id.
Since the decision in Shaw, however, this very broad interpretation of "relates to" has been
narrowed by the Supreme Court in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). Prior to the Travelers decision, preemption cases held
that in determining whether a federal statute preempts state law, Congress' intent controls. See
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). In Travelers, however, the Court indicated that
courts should decide whether ERISA preempts state law, not by asking whether the language
requires it or whether Congress intended it, but by asking whether preemption makes sense as
a matter of ERISA policy. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 646. The Court held, as a matter of ERISA
policy, that any indirect economic effect of a statute is not sufficient to cause preemption;
however, preemption still applies to any state law that attempts to regulate benefit structures or
their administration. Id.
Commentators have had a "field-day" with this decision. See, e.g., Margaret G. Farrell,
ERISA and Managed Care: The Law Abhors a Vacuum, 29 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 268, 269
(1996). Ms. Farrell posits, "[n]arrower interpretation of the 'relates to' provision means that state
managed care regulation is less likely to be held preempted by ERISA where it only has an
indirect economic impact or influence on ERISA plans." Id. See also Karen A. Jordan, Travelers
Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA Pre-emption, 13 YALE J. ON REG.
255, 335 (1996). Ms. Jordan argues the Travelers decision is sending a strong signal that the
scope of ERISA preemption generally should be more restrained than many courts are concluding.
Id. She also argues that the analytical framework for resolving ERISA preemption issues, as
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state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA, such as
reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duties.1' 9 A state law may "relate
to" an employee benefit plan even if the law is not specifically designed
to affect employee benefit plans."0 In other words, a state law is
preempted unless saved from preemption under ERISA § 514(b)(2)(a)
as a law regulating insurance.
derived from Travelers, can effectively restrain findings of preemption if appropriate arguments
are presented to the courts. Id.
As such, the Travelers decision does not affect the discussion in Part III because the issue,
as determined by the federal district court, was not the economic impact of the statute on insurers,
but the direct regulation that binds health insurance plans to specific administrative requirements.
See discussion infra Part III. See also California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, et al.,
v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997) (holding that California's prevailing
wage law neither makes "reference to" nor has "connection with" ERISA plans and, therefore,
does not "relate to" ERISA plans and is not preempted by ERISA).
Dillingham is the most recent Supreme Court case dealing with ERISA preemption. In
deciding whether California's prevailing wage and hour law was preempted by ERISA, the Court
reiterated and further discussed the Travelers holding. Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 838-40. In
discussing the Travelers decision, the Court stated that previous decisions in Shaw, FMC Corp.
v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990), and Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981),
were based on state statutes that "mandated employee benefit structures or their administration."
Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 839. In those cases, the Court restated that the statutory requirements
that were at issue amounted to "connections with" ERISA plans. Id. (citing Travelers, 514 U.S.
at 657-58). They found that the issue in Travelers, however, was a considerable contrast. See
Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 839.
It is important to show how the Travelers issue of an "indirect economic impact" is not
involved in the analysis of ERISA preemption of the "Every Category of Provider" statute. The
state law at issue in Travelers was a statute that regulated hospital rates and required hospitals to
exact surcharges from patients whose hospital bills were paid by any of a variety of non-Blue
Cross/Blue Shield providers. See Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 839 (outlining the facts of Travelers).
Because ERISA plans were predominant among the purchasers of insurance, the statute was
asserted to run afoul of ERISA's preemption provision. See id. at 840 (same). The differential
rates charged to commercially insured patients and to patients insured by "the Blues" made
commercial insurance relatively more expensive-and less attractive. See id. (same). The
resulting cost variations encouraged insurance purchasers, including ERISA plans, to provide
insurance benefits through the Blues. See id. Commercial insurers argued that these cost
variations and their subsequent effects had a connection with those ERISA plans, requiring
preemption of the law that dictated them. See id. (same).
The Court upheld the statute on the grounds that the indirect economic influence of the
surcharge did not "bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of and ERISA plan itself." Id. (citing Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679). In addition, the
indirect influence of the surcharge did not "preclude uniform administrative practice or the
provision of a uniform interstate benefit package if a plan wishe[d] to provide one." Id. (same).
This finding makes it clear that "ERISA will still be held to preempt managed care regulation that
binds health plan administrators to a particular benefit configuration or administrative
requirements." Farrell, supra, at 269.
109. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1990).
110. Id.
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In Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts,"' the U.S.
Supreme Court used a two-part test to determine whether a state law
falls into ERISA's savings clause."' First, the Court must determine
whether there was guidance available from a "common sense view" of
the language of the savings clause itself."' Second, the statute is
analyzed to determine whether it regulates insurance under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act"14 in interpreting the savings clause."'
There are three criteria used to determine whether a practice falls
under the "business of insurance" for purposes of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act: "[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of
transferring or spreading policy holder's risk; second, whether the
practice is an integral part of the policy holder's relationship between
the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited
to entities within the insurance industry."
116
For a state law to be saved from preemption, it must satisfy both
parts of the Metropolitan test, including the three McCarran-Ferguson
criteria."' Accordingly, a state law is preempted by ERISA if it
relates to insurance.' Furthermore, the law can only be "saved"
from preemption if it satisfies both parts of the Metropolitan Life test.
As the following overview of the federal district court decision will
show, the "Every Category of Provider" statute (1) relates to insurance
and (2) is not saved from preemption because it fails both parts of the
Metropolitan Life test." 9
III. WHY THE "EVERY CATEGORY OF PROVIDER" STATUTE IS
RENDERED PREEMPTED BY ERISA
As it was effectively argued by the Plaintiffs in Washington
Physician Service Association v. Gregoire, both the Washington State
Insurance Commissioner's interpretation of the statute, and the statute
111. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
112. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987) (outlining the Metropolitan Life
two-part test).
113. Id.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988).
115. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 48 n.2. "The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides,
in relevant part: 'The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.' 15
U.S.C. § 1012(a)." Id.
116. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 48-49 (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458
U.S. 119 (1983)).
117. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48.
118. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 87.
119. See Washington Physicians Service Ass'n v. Gregoire, 967 F. Supp. 424, 427 (W.D.
Wash. 1997).
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itself, is preempted by ERISA because the statute "relates to"
employee health benefit plans.12' Furthermore, the statute is not
saved from preemption under the two-part Metropolitan Life test.12
A. "Every Category of Provider" Is Preempted as a Law Which
Relates to Employee Benefit Plans
There are four ways in which the statute and its interpretations
relate to ERISA governed plans: (1) by interfering with a carrier's
ability to administer its health benefit plans, (2) by regulating the
structure of employee health benefit plans, (3) by regulating the
content of health benefit plans, and (4) by regulating plan requirements
that vary from state to state.1 22
The statute interferes with a carrier's ability to administer its health
benefit plans because carriers are forced to contract with, to pay claims
for, and not to exclude a category of provider by asserting that the
"category fails to meet the carrier's standards for provision of 'cost
effective and clinically efficacious health services."' 123
Provider contracting, claims payment, quality assurance, and
utilization review are all considered part of a health plan's administra-
tive function. 124  Case law shows that state laws which interfere with
the administration of health benefit plans have a relationship to such
plans for purposes of ERISA preemption. 12' Accordingly, because
the interpretation of the "Every Category of Provider" statute interferes
with health plan administration by proscribing contracting and claims
payment requirements, the law relates to employee benefit plans.
120. See id. at 427; see also discussion infra at Part III, section A.
121. See id. at 427-30; see also discussion infra at Part III, section A.
122. See id. at 426 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656-57).
123. See Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1; Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F.
Supp. at 427 (finding that the statute relates to the administration of employee benefit plans
because it interferes with the plan administrator's discretion of whom to contract with and whom
to pay).
124. If an employer were to contract for "administrative services only, for example," these
are the functions that would be included. Discussion with Jill Mehner, Director of Medical
Management, Health Washington, December 18, 1996.
125. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656-657 (holding that preemption still applies to any state
law that attempts to regulate their administration); Fort Halifax Packing Company, Inc. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1. 9 (1987) (stating that plan administration is a central feature of ERISA); Hayden v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 843 F. Supp. 1427, 1432 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (finding that
an Alabama statute requiring direct payment to nurse anesthetists had a direct affect on
administration by mandating who they must pay, and therefore "relates to" employee benefit
plans); General Motors Corp. v. Caldwell, 647 F. Supp. 585, 587 (N.D. Georgia 1994) (finding
that a law establishing a pricing formula for prescription drugs related to employee benefit plans
because it created an administrative procedure with which plan administrators, plan beneficiaries,
and participating pharmacies must comply).
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Another way in which the statute relates to employee benefit plans
is by regulating the structure of employee benefit plans. '26 The
Bulletin requires employee health benefit plans to permit every
category of provider to provide health services for conditions included
in the Basic Health Plan (BHP).'27 The Declaratory Order states
that as long as the condition is covered by the BHP, every category of
treatment by every category of provider must be covered. 2' This
requirement does not allow ERISA governed plans to exclude a health
plan benefit structure which does not include every category of
provider." 9 Furthermore, "[t]he [statute] relates to content because a
health plan is required to cover provider services that it did not cover
previously."' 30  This requirement directly regulates the structure of
employee benefit plans.
A recent case in Louisiana examined a statute similar to Washing-
ton's "Every Category of Provider," entitled "Any Willing Provid-
er."'' The Court found that such arrangements were related to the
structure of the plan and were preempted as follows:
Unlike the New York statute at issue in Travelers, Louisiana's Any
Willing Provider statute specifically mandates that certain benefits
available to ERISA plans must be constructed in a particular
manner. In other words, the Louisiana statute does not merely raise
the cost of the implicated benefits; it delineates their very structure.
As such, the statute falls outside the purview of the limited
Travelers holding: the Court there repeatedly recognized that
ERISA preempts state laws that mandate employee benefit struc-
tures.1 32
The Washington statute substantially resembles the Louisiana
statute because the benefits must be constructed in a particular
126. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656-657 (holding that preemption still applies to any state
law that attempts to regulate benefit structures).
127. See Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1.
128. See Declaratory Order G96-13, supra note 18, Finding #1.
129. See Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 427; see also Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment of ERISA Preemption of State Law at 5,
Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 424 (No. C96-5850FDB) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Memorandum] (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
130. Id. at 5 (citing Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d
500, 502 (4th Cir. 1993)) (stating that a statute which restricts the ability of an insurance company
to limit the choice of providers "relates to" an employee benefit plan).
131. See Cigna Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v. State of Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir.
1996).
132. Id. at 649 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657).
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manner. 133  Further, "[t]here is also the risk of conflicting and
inconsistent state and local regulation, as, for example, an Oregon
employer who contracts with a health carrier in Washington to cover
employees in Washington would have to comply with the [statute]
even if there were no such mandate for the employer in Oregon.' 1 34
Thus, the "Every Category of Provider" statute relates to employee
benefit plans and ERISA preempts it unless it is saved from preemp-
tion as a law regulating insurance. 35
B. "Every Category of Provider" Is not Saved from Preemption as a
Law Regulating Insurance
The statute relates to employee benefit plans, and thus is preempt-
ed unless saved from preemption under ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) as a law
regulating insurance. 136  A statute is not saved from preemption
merely because it is part of the state insurance code. 37 Furthermore,
the statute must meet both the common sense view and each of the
McCarran-Ferguson131 criteria in order to be saved from preemp-
tion. 139
1. Common Sense View
To the extent that the statute applies to HMOs, it fails the
"common sense view" of the Metropolitan Life test. This first tier of
the Metropolitan Life test analyzes, under a "common sense view,"
whether the law at issue "regulates insurance," that is, whether the law
133. The plaintiffs in the federal district court case argued this point as follows:
Like the Louisiana statute, the 'every category of provider' Alternative Provider
Mandate Statute and State Interpretations affect the very structure of employee benefit
plans. The... Statute and... (i]nterpretations annul provisions in existing employee
benefit plans that are designed to take advantage of Limited categories of providers that
are chosen by the plan. The Insurance Commissioner has indicated that employee
benefit plans must be modified and provider contracts expanded to meet its interpreta-
tion by October 1, 1996. The fact that [these insurance contracts] now in existence
must be re-written to cover a wide variety of additional providers conclusively
establishes a change in the structure of employee benefit plans.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 129, at 7; accord Order, supra note 119, at 5.
134. Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 427.
135. See Cigna Healthplan of Louisiana, 82 F.3d at 649. (holding that a state law, which
prohibited a plan from excluding any willing provider, related to an ERISA plan, citing
Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)).
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137. See Tingle v. Pacific Mutual Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1993).
138. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 48.
139. Cigna Health Plan of Louisiana, 82 F.3d at 649; Tingle, 996 F.2d at 107.
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is specifically directed at the insurance industry.4 ' The common
sense view excludes from that savings clause entities that are not
involved in the business of insurance.' 4' The statute is directed at
"health carriers," which are defined as "disability insurer[s] regulated
under chapter 48.20 or 48.21 RCW, health services contractor[s] as
defined in RCW 48.44.010, and health maintenance organization[s] as
defined in RCW 48.46.020. 1142 "Thus, on its face, the [Every
Category of Provider] statute is not directed simply at insurers, but
also at HMOs." '43  In Washington, HMOs are not considered
insurers. 14 4  Title 48, chapter 46, section 60 of the Washington
Revised Code states in pertinent part:
(1) Any health maintenance organization may enter into agreements
with or for the benefit of persons or groups of persons, which
require prepayment for health care services by or for such persons
in consideration of the health maintenance organization providing
health care services to such persons. Such activity is not subject to
the laws relating to insurance if the health care services are rendered
directly by the health maintenance organization or by any provider
which has a contract or other arrangement with the health mainte-
nance organization to render health services to enrolled partici-
pants. 45
However, in Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Citizens Insurance Co. of
America,"' an HMO was held to be an insurer for purposes of the
ERISA savings clause. The court stated:
HMOs and insurance companies share the indicia of the 'business
of insurance.' Both assume the risk that their members or insurers
will require benefits in excess of the consideration paid. An HMO
accepts the risk as an obligation to directly provide benefits to its
members. An insurance company accepts the risk as an obligation
to indemnify its insurers for the cost of such benefits. The
difference is not material. In either scheme the principle is the
140. See Washington Physicians ServiceAss'n, 967 F. Supp. at 427; Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 129, at 15 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 48).
141. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 48.
142. Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 428; Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 129, at 18-20.
143. Id.; Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 129, at 18.
144. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.46.060(1) (1996).
145. Id.
146. 673 F. Supp. 903 (1987).
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same: for a fixed fee, the risk and responsibility of providing
benefits is shifted from a beneficiary to a third party insurer. 147
In order to settle the conflict of whether an HMO is in the
business of insurance, looking at a widely accepted definition of
insurance is necessary. Insurance is a "contract by which one party,
for a consideration ... promises to make a certain payment of money
upon the destruction or injury of something in which the other party
has an interest.""14  In a health insurance contract, the risk insured
against is the risk of illness or injury suffered by the beneficiary.149
In contrast, in Washington an HMO is neither an insurer nor an entity
within the insurance industry, but rather a health care delivery
system. 50 The legislature has spoken in the HMO Act as to what
it considers to be the function or definition of an HMO:
The Legislature declares that the establishment of a qualified
prepaid group and individual practice health care delivery systems
should be encouraged in order to provide all citizens of the state
with the freedom of choice between competitive, alternative health
care delivery systems necessary to realize their right to health. It is
the purpose and policy of this Chapter to provide for the develop-
ment and registration of prepaid group and individual practice
health care plans as health maintenance organizations, which the
Legislature declares to be in the interest of the health, safety and
welfare of the people.''
Unlike an insurer, whose obligation is to indemnify another,152 an
HMO is an organization "which provides comprehensive services to
enrolled participants... either directly or through contractual or other
arrangements with other institutions, entities or persons.' ' 5 3 Accord-
147. Id. at 907. See also Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
883 F.2d 1101, 1107-09 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that HMOs are in the business of insurance
under the McCarran-Ferguson test in the context of the service contracts offered to subscribers).
148. Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 428 (citing COUCH ON
INSURANCE, 2D, § 1:2 (1984)). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.040 (1996) (insurance is a
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay a specified amount upon
determinable contingencies).
149. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 129, at 18 (citing Jordan v. Group Health
Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1934)).
150. See Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 428; Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 129, at 19.
151. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 129, at 19 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.46.020(1) (1996)).
152. See Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 428 (citing WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.01.040 (1996)).
153. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 129, at 19 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.46.020(1) (1996)).
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ingly, the defining feature of an HMO is to provide service and not
insurance.'54  Therefore, in concurrence with the legislative
intent,'55 health services, as provided by an HMO are not subject to
insurance laws.
Under the common sense view, those entities that do not provide
insurance, but provide services, are excluded from the laws regulating
insurance.156 Therefore, the common sense view of the Metropolitan
Life test fails because an HMO is subject to the statute and "this alone
would be enough to remove the [statute] and its interpretations from
savings clause protection leaving them preempted by ERISA section
514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144."' 7  "But assuming, arguendo, that the
[statute] passes the 'common sense' test, The McCarran-Ferguson
'business of insurance' test must be satisfied."'58
The statute also fails the second tier or the "business of insurance"
test under Metropolitan Life. The statute does not meet any one of the
three factors of the McCarran-Ferguson test. 5 9
2. The McCarran-Ferguson Criteria
The first factor in the McCarran-Ferguson test is whether the
practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's
risk.160 "The risk spreading principle concerns the nature of the
coverage of the policy-in other words, the risks of injury that the
insurance company will bear for the insured."'' Accordingly, risk
transfer occurs as a result of the contract between the policyholder and
the carrier or insurance company. 62 The contract spells out what
154. See Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 428.
155. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.46.020(1) (1996).
156. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 48.
157. Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 428. 1 recognize that it is because
the Washington Legislature has determined that HMOs offered to Washington residents will not
be subject to the laws relating to insurance (WASH. REV. CODE § 48.46.060(1)) that the argument
from the Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. case fails. See supra note 147 and accompany-
ing text. The argument that HMOs are in the business of insurance, whether in Washington
or anywhere else, is beyond the scope of this Comment (but worthy of mention and perhaps
another topic for publication).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 41 U.S. at 48.
161. Washington Physicians ServiceAss'n, 967 F. Supp. at 429 (citing Smith v. Jefferson Pilot
Life Ins. Co., 14 F.3d 562, 569 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994); see also Tingle
v. Pacific Mutual Ins. Co., 996 F.2d at 108 n.13 ("we must focus on the actual risks that were
transferred from the insured to the insurer and determine if the practice acts to alter the
contractual apportionment of the risks").
162. See id.
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conditions are covered and what conditions are excluded. 163  The
insurance company accepts the risk for those conditions enumerated in
the policy; the policyholder or subscriber pays the insurance company
to accept that risk. The contract for insurance is between the
policyholder and the insurance company.
"Every Category of Provider" is part of title 48, or the Insurance
Code, and is directed at entities within the insurance industry.'
1 4
However, the statute does not have the effect of transferring policy-
holder risk, and is not an integral part of the relationship between the
policyholder and the carrier, or the insured and the insurer. 16  Risk
is transferred by the contract between the carrier and the policyholder,
not by the carrier's contract with a provider. The provider simply
provides services for those covered conditions enumerated in the
policyholder's contract. 66 The effect of the statute is on the relation-
ship between the insurer and the service provider, not on risk
transfer. 67
In Hayden v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama,68 the court
applied the McCarran-Ferguson factors to an Alabama statute which
mandated payment for some of the services within the scope of practice
of a certified registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA), if performed by the
CRNA.'69 The CRNAs brought a class action seeking a declaration
that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama was required to pay the
CRNAs directly under certain circumstances.7' Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama refused to pay the CRNAs. 171
The court in Hayden concluded that the statute was not saved from
preemption as a law regulating insurance172 because the Alabama
statute did not transfer policyholder risk. 173  The plaintiffs argued
that the beneficiary [of services] would be required to pay for services
163. See Sample Certificate of Coverage for the BHP (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review). This certificate, or contract, tells the subscriber what conditions are covered by the BHP
and what conditions are excluded. The State, or the contracted "carrier," assumes the risk for
those covered conditions. In the case of the BHP, the State or the individual subscriber
depending upon whether that subscriber is subsidized, pays a premium to the carrier for assuming
the risk of those covered conditions.
164. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.045 (1996).
165. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 129, at 21-24.
166. See id. at 22.
167. See id.
168. 843 F. Supp. 1427 (Ala. 1994).
169. See id. at 1429.
170. See id. at 1428.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1439.
173. See id. at 1434.
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under the statute as it exists now, and not have to pay under the plan
as enforced by the statute at issue: the statute has the effect of
transferring the risk of payment.17 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument, holding that the statute did not expand the treatment avail-
able. 17' The statute merely imposed liability upon Blue Cross by
requiring payment for a certain category of provider providing the
treatment.176  Since the primary effect of the statute was on the
relationship between Blue Cross and the CRNAs, it did not affect the
relationship between the carrier and the policy holder.
77
The Hayden court relied upon Group Life and Health Insurance v.
Royal Drug Co.'78 In Royal Drug, the Court concluded that agree-
ments between an insurer and pharmacies limiting the amount a
pharmacy could charge the insurer's policyholders for prescription
drugs, were not the business of insurance under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.'79 The agreements did not spread risk but were
arrangements defining the scope of covered goods and services.' 0
Similarly, the "Every Category of Provider" statute does not
transfer or spread policyholder risk because it is not an integral part of
the policy relationship between the carrier and the policyholder.''
The statute and its interpretation impact the relationship between the
carrier and the provider, not the carrier and the policyholder. 2
An interesting counterargument, however, was asserted by the
defendant State'83 which posited that the statute and its interpretation
does spread and transfer risk.' The main thrust of the argument
was that a mandatory provider law, like the one at issue, requires that
the contract between the policyholder and the carrier permit the policy-
holder the choice among all categories of providers for treatment of a




178. See id., (citing, Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 212-14).
179. See Hayden, 843 F. Supp. at 1435.
180. See id.
181. See Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 429-30; Plaintiffs' Memoran-
dum, supra note 129, at 22-23.
182. See Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 429-30; Plaintiffs' Memoran-
dum, supra note 129, at 22-23.
183. Washington Physicians Service Ass'n v. Gregoire, 967 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. Wash.
1997).
184. See State Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and In Support of Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 32, Washington
Physician Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. 424 (No. C96-5850FDB) (on file with the Seattle University
Law Review).
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particular ailment.'85 This choice among all categories of providers
shifts the risk and cost of treatment delivered by such providers from
the policyholder to the insurer.'86 The State argued that this is done
by forcing the carrier to bear the risk that the policyholder will exercise
the benefit option of securing treatment from alternative providers.
18 7
As a result, carriers are forced to accept and be subject to a greater
universe of benefit demands because policyholders can choose any type
of provider to treat their ailment.'88
What this argument fails to recognize is that the traditional
definitions of risk transfer are between carrier and policyholder. Just
because a policyholder chooses an alternative provider to treat an
ailment, the risk transferring arrangement does not change. The carrier
assumes the risk for the policyholder's ailments, not the risk for the
type of treatment rendered by an alternative provider. Further,
policyholders often do not make their own treatment decisions. In a
managed care system, policyholders do not automatically get the choice
of what kind of provider will treat their ailments. Through the process
of managing care, primary care providers make referrals, but insurers
must approve and certify treatment, as well as approve who will
provide that particular treatment. Risk, therefore, is transferred
because of the policyholder's relationship with the carrier, not because
of the carrier's relationship with the provider. Accordingly, because
the interpretation of "Every Category of Provider" governs the
contracts with providers and does not involve spreading risk, the
statute as interpreted is not saved from preemption as a law regulating
insurance under the first McCarran-Ferguson criterion 9
The second of the McCarran-Ferguson criteria, whether the
practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured,19 is also not met in this instance. This
criterion requires that the interpretation of the statute define, and be
185. See id. at 33.
186. See id. at 36.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. One federal circuit court case concluded that a state statue mandating the inclusion of
providers did regulate insurance. See Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Health Management,
995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993); see also Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 129, at 24. The statute in question applied only to insurance companies, not to ERISA
plans. Stuart Circle Hospital Corp., 995 F.2d at 502. In addition, a recent decision has expressly
rejected the reasoning of Stuart Circle on the basis that Stuart Circle was simply mistaken in its
assumption that "any willing provider" statutes spread or transfer risk or increase covered
benefits. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Neilson, 917 F. Supp. 1532, 1541 (N.D.
Ala. 1996); see also Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 429-30.
190. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 48-50.
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integral to, the terms of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured.' 9' The policyholder/carrier or insured/insurer relation-
ship is defined by the terms of the contract between them.' 9
As discussed above, the interpretation of the "Every Category of
Provider" statute regulates the terms of the relationship between the
carrier and the providers, not the relationship between the carrier and
policyholders. The focus of the statute, as interpreted, is primarily on
the kind of providers with which the carriers must contract, not how
carriers or policyholders carry out their obligations under the insurance
contract. 193  This statute does not mandate benefits that would be
considered interference with the contractual relationship between the
carrier and policyholder.' 94 It mandates the inclusion of alternative
providers who may provide services for covered benefits.19 There-
fore, the second McCarran-Ferguson criterion is not satisfied because
the practice being regulated is a practice that is exclusively between the
carrier and the provider and is not integral to the carrier-policyholder
relationship. 19
In order to meet the third criterion of the McCarrari-Ferguson
analysis, the statute must be limited solely to the insurance indus-
try.197 As discussed above, the interpretation of the "Every Category
of Provider" statute reaches beyond insurers to include HMOs.'
HMOs are not considered insurers under the Washington Revised
Code. 199 An HMO is a health care delivery system, not an insurance
company. Its primary focus is on health care and not insurance. 00
In summary, in order for the "Every Category of Provider" statute
and its interpretations to avoid preemption, it must represent the
regulation of insurance under both a common sense view and each of
the three criteria of the McCarran-Ferguson test as presented in
Metropolitan Life.2"' The interpretation of the statute fails to satisfy
any of these four requirements. Therefore, as written and interpreted
191. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 129, at 25.
192. See id. (citing Jefferson Pilot, 14 F.3d at 570); see also Order, supra note 119, at 10.
193. See Washington Physicians ServiceAss'n, 967 F. Supp. at 430; Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 129, at 25.
194. See Washington Physicians ServiceAss'n, 967 F. Supp. at 430; Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 129, at 25.
195. See Bulletin, 95-9, supra note 13.
196. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 129, at 26.
197. See id. (citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. 49; Jefferson Pilot, 14 F.3d 569).
198. See Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1.
199. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
200. See id.
201. See supra Part II.
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by the Insurance Commissioner the "Every Category of Provider"
statute is preempted and may not be saved under the exception. There
is no way around this result. Therefore, the federal district court
decision rendering the statute and its interpretations preempted was
rightly decided. As such, the only way to save the statute is to rewrite
it in accordance with the Legislature's intent.
IV. A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION WOULD HAVE
RENDERED A DIFFERENT RESULT
There are two ways in which a different interpretation would not
have rendered the statute preempted by ERISA. The first, which can
be disposed of rather quickly, is that if the Insurance Commissioner
had issued a mandate different from the one issued in Bulletin 95-9,
the statute would not be preempted because the litigation would not
have ensued. The second argument is that the "Every Category of
Provider" statute is not a law that "relates to" insurance if it is
rewritten as it should have been in 1995 when the 1993 Reform Act
was repealed.
A. A Different Interpretation by Commissioner Senn Would Have
Preempted the Litigation
As discussed above, there was no litigation over the language of the
statute until after issuance of the Bulletin. 20 2  Furthermore, the
second lawsuit regarding the statute was not filed until September 19,
1996, which was after the Thurston County Superior Court rulings
were issued in support of the Commissioner. 20 3 The only alternative
that remained for the carriers after the ruling was to remove the
ERISA claim and file it in federal court. °4 In so doing, the carriers
added the argument that the statute itself, including and not limited to
its interpretations, was preempted by ERISA.20
This timeline is evidence that if another less-restrictive mandate
had been issued, ultimate preemption would probably not have
occurred. For example, rather than applying the statute to "every plan
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in Washington on or after
January 1, 1996, to include all categories of providers in every health
202. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
204. See Washington: Carriers Sue Insurance Commissioner On Alternative Provider Require-
ment, HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (BNA), Jan. 11, 1996, at D-8.
205. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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plan,"2 °6 Commissioner Senn could have stated that the law was not
a mandate that every category of provider be included in every health
plan. Rather, it was a "mandate that if a consumer has a condition for
which coverage exists, a primary care physician must be able to treat
or refer a patient to a provider who can provide prevention, cure, or
treatment of an injury or disease.12 °7 This is not a mandate that a
primary care physician must refer a patient; it is an option to refer a
patient who has a specific injury or disease to an appropriate licensed
provider, which might include a referral to an alternative care provider.
In fact, Commissioner Senn, in her brief submitted to Thurston
County Superior Court, put forth this more permissive interpretation
as her actual interpretation of the statute.208 If this was indeed the
interpretation, carriers would have had an easier time integrating all
categories of providers and their services into their existing sys-
tems.20 9 Again, what is so ironic and so troubling about this whole
process is that the system defined by the more permissive interpreta-
tion is the one that is in place now, and it has been in place since the
litigation over the statute began. 210 Hopefully, hindsight will serve
as a lesson for future interpretory mandates and prevent unnecessary
expense and litigation for all affected parties.
The second argument, focusing on a different interpretation, is that
the "Every Category of Provider" statute is not a law that "relates to"
employee benefit plans if it is written as it should have been in 1995
when the 1993 Act was repealed.
B. An Analysis of the Statute's History Shows That the Law Was
Written Incorrectly by the 1995 Legislature
As discussed in Part I, when the "Every Category of Provider"
language first appeared in former title 43, chapter 72 of the Washing-
ton Revised Code, it required certified health plans to:
permit every category of health provider to provide health services
or care for conditions included in uniform benefits package to the
extent that:
206. Bulletin 95-9, supra note 13, at 1.
207. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text; see also Reply Brief, State Defendant,
supra note 58, at 8-9.
208. See Reply Brief, State Defendant, supra note 58, at 8-9.
209. See discussion supra at note 34.
210. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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(a) The provision of such health services or care is within the
health care providers' permitted scope of practices; and
(b) The providers agree to abide by the standards related to:
(i) Provision, utilization review, and cost containment or
health services;
(ii) Management and administrative procedures; and
(iii) Provision of cost-effective and clinically efficacious
health services.21'
The legislature clearly wanted Washingtonians to have the option to
choose health services from a full range of providers, including licensed
alternative care practitioners.212 What is important about the above
language is that the law applied to certified health plans-not to health
carriers.213 It is true that certified health plans included disability
insurers, HSCSs, and HMOs, but the health care system under which
certified health plans were to operate is quite different from the system
that exists today.
Under the 1993 Reform Act, health carriers had the option of
becoming certified health plans. 14 Being designated as a certified
health plan was significant because individuals and employers were, in
some instances, required to purchase health insurance through those
certified health plans.215 In order to become a certified health plan,
disability insurers, HSCSs, and HMOs had to meet certain standards,
which included, inter alia, providing benefits equal to the uniform
benefits package, managing the provision of health care services, and
permitting all categories of providers to provide their licensed
services. 16 Washington residents and Washington employers were
required to participate."t 7 Individuals not enrolled in an employer or
government-sponsored plan, for example, were required to purchase a
uniform benefits package from a certified health plan by July 1,
1999.218 Those disability insurers, HSCSs, and HMOs that wanted
to sell insurance benefits to individuals had to do so through a certified
211. See former WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.100 (1993).
212. See former WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.170(2) (1993).
213. See former WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.100 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.005(8)
(1996).
214. See former WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.
215. See 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 464 (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
216. See 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 427 (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
217. See 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 §§ 463-64 (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
218. See 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 463 (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
Individuals are not subject to ERISA laws because they do not purchase or receive insurance
through an employer-sponsored health benefit plan. Title I, ERISA Sec. 3(1).
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health plan. Employers offering employer-sponsored plans, however,
were treated differently under the Act.
The reason for the emphasis on employers, not just individuals,
was that the legislature recognized "that many of the state's small
business owners provide health insurance to their employees through
small group policies at a cost that directly affects their profitability,"
and that "[o]ther small business owners are prevented from providing
health benefits to their employees by the lack of access to affordable
health insurance coverage. '  As such, the legislature intended that
through reform health insurance would be made more available and
more affordable to small businesses in Washington.22°
The 1993 Reform Act required employers with more than five
hundred employees to "[o]ffer a choice of the uniform benefits package
as provided by at least three available certified health plans before July
1, 1995." '221 Second, those employers with more than one hundred
qualified employees had to "[o]ffer a choice of the uniform benefits
package as provided by at least three available certified health plans by
July 1, 1997." '222 Lastly, by July 1, 1997 all employers were required
to "[o]ffer a choice of the uniform benefits package as provided by at
least three available certified health plans. 223 In addition, employers
could opt out of these requirements by purchasing insurance through
the BHP or a health insurance purchasing cooperative. 24
Essentially, all employers had to offer their employees a choice of
insurance through three certified health plans by July 1, 1997. They
could also, however, provide any other health insurance option-in
addition to the three certified plans-to their employees. Accordingly,
there were options available for employers and health carriers under the
1993 Reform Act in that carriers could offer a certified health plan or
any other health plan to employers.22 Therefore, the Reform Act
219. 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 463(1) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
220. Id.
221. 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 464(2) (these large employers also had the option of self-
insuring which would have exempted them from reform requirements) (repealed by 1995 Wash.
Laws ch. 265 § 27).
222. 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 464(3) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
223. 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 464(4) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
224. 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 464(2)(3)(4) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27);
see also 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 492 § 425(1) (defining Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives
as "geographic regions within the state ... based on population .... geographic factors; market
conditions; and other factors ... [there shall be] one health insurance purchasing cooperative per
region") (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27).
225. Health carriers include: disability insurers, WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.010(12) (1996);
HSCSs § 48.44.010(3) (1996); HMOs § 48.55.010(12) (1996). Under the Reform Act, both
disability insurers and HSCSs could provide plans other than those they registered as certified
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did not include an absolute mandate that every employer-sponsored
health benefit plan provided by a health carrier permit every category
of provider in each of those health plans.
Why, if this was the situation, did the 1995 Legislature state that
"Every health plan delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed by a
health carrier on and after January 1, 1996, [be required] to permit
every category of provider to provide health services for health services
included in the Basic Health Plan? ' 226 The answer is simple: they
did not intend to. The Legislature inserted the words health carrier
instead of certified health plan because they appear analogous in that
they are defined similarly. They are not, however, analogous because
every certified health plan did not mean every health plan delivered,
issued, or renewed by a health carrier in Washington state.27  Both
employers and carriers had options.228 What the Legislature did not
realize when it changed the language was that in doing so it had
mandated "Every Category of Provider" be included in every health
plan provided by every health carrier in Washington. Hence, it is the
words every health plan and health carrier that renders the statute
preempted by ERISA.
Since the Republican-dominated Legislature intended to completely
repeal the laws requiring insurers, health care providers, employers,
and consumers to comply with the 1993 Reform Act, it is odd that the
Legislature did not pay better attention to the language. A review of
the Washington law provides no further insight. Legislative history
surrounding the repeal of the Reform Act, however, makes it clear that
the lawmakers who voted for the statute intended to make alternative
medicine available under the controls of managed care.22 9  The
Legislature did not mean every health plan; what it meant was certified
or managed health plans.230 In addition, it arguably did not mean to
add the words health carrier because of the sweeping impact of that
health plans. Their respective licenses would have allowed them to market other types of plans
such as a point of service plans. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.010(3)(12) (1996). HMOs,
however, could only have marketed capitated, prepaid services. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.44.010(12) (1996). Because of this fact, HMOs would have been more limited under health
care reform, because they could only have provided a certified health plan option and a
noncertified health plan option with benefits differing from plan to plan rather than differing types
of plans.
226. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.045 (1996) (emphasis added).
227. See former WASH. REV. CODE § 43.72.100 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.045
(1996).
228. See supra notes 214-25 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (citing former WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.43.170(1) & (2) (repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265 § 27)).
230. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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language. It inserted those words in the belief that the words most
closely matched certified health plan, which, as concluded above, means
something quite different. Thus, if the statute were to read as
intended but not as written, it would say:
Health plans delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed on or after
January 1, 1996, shall:
(1) Permit every category of health care provider to provide
health services or care for conditions included in the basic
health plan to the extent that:
(a) The provision of such health services or care is within
the health care providers' permitted scope of practice; and
(b) The providers agree to abide by standards related to:
(i) Provision, utilization review and cost containment
health services;
(ii) Management and administrative procedures; and
(iii) Provision of cost-effective and clinically effica-
cious health services.
The above language is inserted instead of "every health plan delivered,
issued for delivery, or renewed by a health carrier."'231 If this lan-
guage-the intended language-is used, the statute would withstand
ERISA preemption because, as per the Travelers decision, the statute
would have little or no indirect economic impact because plan
administrators are not bound to any particular choice.
To reiterate, in Travelers, the Court held that any indirect
economic effect of a statute is not sufficient to cause preemption;
however, preemption still would apply to any state law that attempts
to regulate benefit structures or their administration.232 By changing
the language of the "Every Category of Provider" statute to comport
with legislative intent, as well as with a more permissive interpreta-
tion,2 33 the statute no longer attempts to regulate benefits structures
or their administration. Plan administrators would have the freedom
and discretion of whom to contract with and whom to pay.234 In this
scenario, even if the Bulletin's mandate were still in effect, only the
interpretation-not the statute itself-would be preempted.
231. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.045 (1996).
232. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. at 646; see also Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 426.
233. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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Once the statute is written in a way in which it does not regulate
benefit structures or their administration, the issue of whether the
statute has an indirect economic impact or influence or ERISA plans
will have to be decided. Accordingly, the way the statute should have
been written and interpreted has little or no indirect economic impact
or influence on ERISA plans. First, there is no regulation of rates or
exaction of fees or surcharges associated with the statute.235 Second,
with none of the aforementioned items required by the newly-written
statute, the only possible economic impact would be on the risk-
bearing responsibility of ERISA plans. And, as already illustrated, the
statute and its interpretations (mandatory or permissive) do not spread
risk. 236  "The choice of health care provider has nothing to do with
spreading the risk of coverage. . . . [S]preading the risk entails the
amount of coverage that the insurer will bear for the treatment of a
particular injury or procedure-not who will perform the treat-
ment. 1237 Therefore, as a matter of ERISA policy, the statute as
correctly interpreted and newly-written does not "relate to" ERISA
plans because it is simply managed care regulation that has no direct,
or even indirect, economic impact or influence on them.238
CONCLUSION
The "Every Category of Provider" statute was public interest
legislation passed in order to provide health insurance policyholders the
choice of alternative care providers in certain situations proscribed by
the statute. The statute was not a blanket mandate forcing insurance
carriers to include every category of provider in every one of their
health insurance benefit plans.
As such, the statute and its interpretation should be revisited.
Because the federal district court decision preempting the statute was
rightly decided, the Ninth Circuit should not reach any other
conclusion when reviewing the federal district court order: the statute
is unambiguous.
Alternatively, it would be in the legislature's best interest to
reconsider the language of this statute and rewrite it so that it comports
with federal law. Washingtonians have made it clear that they want
alternative medicine made available through their health insurance
235. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 646.
236. See supra notes 161-90 and accompanying text.
237. Washington Physicians Service Ass'n, 967 F. Supp. at 429 (citing Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama v. Nielson, 917 F. Supp. 1532, 1542 (N.D. Ala. 1996)).
238. See Farrell, supra note 108, at 269.
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plans. The statute ensures this process will continue by supporting the
insurance industry, the traditional health care industry, and the
alternative medicine industry in creating a system that provides-in the
most cost-effective, quality-based manner-access to and treatment by
all licensed categories of providers.
